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RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS BY REBELS IN
AFGHANISTAN: THE ROLE OF PAKISTANI MADRASAS
This study investigates the link between religious schools, called madrassas, in
Pakistan and recruitment and use of child soldiers in the long-lasting armed
conflict in Afghanistan. A great deal of existing research on this and related
topics has pointed to Pakistani madrassas as primary recruitment sites for the
underage soldiers fighting in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, yet the precise
circumstances on how the militancy entered the madrasa are insufficiently
presented. The study examines the topic from the international law perspective
as well as national legislations of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The bulk of the
research relies on the use of doctrinal method. The relevant treaties, and the
laws of Afghanistan and Pakistan are analysed. Additionally, the research uses
qualitative textual analysis of relevant non-legal sources for the study. Research
findings indicate that national laws of Afghanistan and Pakistan are congruent
with international provisions on child soldiering. As a result, the study establishes
that more underage combatants have been recruited from the Pakistani
madrassas during the period of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the civil
war that resulted in the Taliban assuming power in Afghanistan than it has
been the case in the post 9/11 stage of armed conflict in Afghanistan.
The relationship between religious schools called madrasas and
militancy involving child soldiers in Afghanistan and Pakistan has
caught the attention of numerous researchers, lawyers and policy-
makers in the past several decades. Since the four-decade-long
armed conflict or series of conflicts in Afghanistan has
uninterruptedly seen a large number of underage combatants, the
issue at hand has become more pressing and in need of examination,
explanation and proposed solutions. More than a millennium old
tradition of Islamic schooling under the institution named after
the Arabic word - madrassa, and adopted in the main languages of
Afghanistan and Pakistan to mean a religious school or seminary
had never been linked to militancy until the late 20th century.
However, since the Soviets unleashed their military means to spread
their influence and communist ideology into Afghanistan – a
country where Islamic teaching and culture have been the essential
elements of ethos for about 1,400 years, then it was only natural
to mobilise all available means to resist the clearly alien ideology.
Thus, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, under the approval
and sponsorship of some Muslim Gulf states and the United States
of America (USA), some madrasas in Pakistan started to openly
preach and teach militancy to their students. Few researchers,
scholars and policy-makers from the region or even from any
country worldwide did at time look into the future repercussions
of such unthoughtful propagation of militancy. During the 1980s,
when the United Nations (UN) and many other international
organisations were shaped by the reality of the Cold War, the
international law was certainly less direct and consequential with
regard to child soldiering; as a result, virtually no international
pressure was directed to either Pakistan or parties to the conflict
in Afghanistan to contain recruitment and use of underage soldiers
in hostilities.
In order to gain a better grasp of the phenomenon of child
soldiering, it is necessary to clarify a number of key terms, primarily
the concept and reality of recruitment of child soldiers and the
use of children in combat. Before children take part in actual
combat, they need to be brought into the armed force or armed
group in the procedure known under the generic name of
recruitment. There are a number of ways by which children or
young persons are allowed or made to join an armed force or armed
group. For the purpose of clear and systematic presentation, the
multitudes of these ways are categorised into three groups:
compulsory conscription, forced recruitment and voluntary
recruitment (Happold, 2005 and Bainomugisha, 2011). One of
the most common methods that is in accordance with national
laws is known as compulsory recruitment or conscription, whereby
the recruit is under legal obligation to perform military service for
a certain period (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of
Justice, 2014).  Second, in situations of forced recruitment a
military unit uses crude force to compel children into its ranks.
Hence, children do not virtually have any choice to evade forcible
conscription as they get kidnapped from their homes or public
places and thrown into military or militia ranks at gunpoint
(Achvarina, 2010 and Ballesteros, 2010). Third, voluntary
enlistment happens when underage persons choose to enlist
without force or threats and in the absence of legal provisions
requiring them join the armed force or militia. In other words,
children decide to become soldiers of their own will (Achvarina,
2010 and Ballesteros, 2010).
However, as the armed conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere
around the world have attested, the decision by children to enlist
is made under circumstances that strongly pull the child in this
direction. Numerous other factors such as lack of education and
employment opportunities, abject poverty, orphaning and
separation of children from parents and other family members,
joining a military unit in order to seek revenge, and enlisting to
benefit from sexual services act as less obvious pulling forces towards
full-fledged soldiering (Topa, 2007). Soon after the step of
conscription or enlistment is finalised, child soldiers are ordered
to serve on capacities as any other soldier. Thus, child soldiers are
used as scouts, spies or intelligence gatherers, drummer boys,
messengers, porters, servants, cooks and cook assistants. In the
more recent conflicts, underage soldiers have started assuming
similar roles to adult fighters, such as regular soldiers, guerrilla
fighters, cooks and human shields (Bosch, 2015). Contemporary
conflicts have also highlighted the roles of both young girls and
boys as objects of to carry out terrorist and suicide attacks (Jones,
2015). This wide range of capacities for the use of child soldiers
therefore warranted a clarification and explanation.
Madrasa types of schools are nearly as old as institutionalised
dissemination of knowledge in Muslim world. In fact, in the early
centuries of institutionalised Islamic learning, madrassa was the
highest and the most elaborate college of learning, where initially
Islamic law was studied, but it also included in its syllabus the
other essential sciences of the Islamic learning, such as sciences of
the Qur’an and hadith (Siddique, 2009). According to Makdisi,
(Makdisi, 1981) madrasa colleges directly evolved from masjid
learning circle and the establishment of khan, or dormitory for
students who aspired to further their learning for another period
of about four to eight years after initial four years of study spent in
masjid school. In other words, madrasa emerged soon after the
masjid form of education was accompanied by the building of
lodging for the needs of full-time students. The continuous nature
of education in mosques and the requirements of proper lodging
required sustained financial backing, and this was provided by
the Islamic philanthropists who donated substantial amount of
their property to be used under the regulation of waqf, or Islamic
endowment (Makdisi, 1981). Therefore, the students of madrasa
in the early period of Islamic higher learning were sponsored and
supported by the means acquired through the institution of waqf.
These features of madrasa, its focus on religious courses with strong
emphasis on Islamic law and the reliance on waqf patronage, have
remained largely unchanged in many Muslim lands throughout
centuries until the present day (Makdisi, 1981).
One of the first madrasas founded in Muslim world was recorded
to the Fatimid madrasa in Egypt established in the beginning of
the 11th century (Anzar, 2003). This madrasa contained the core
courses on Islamic law and other fundamental Islamic sciences.
Moreover, the sources on this madrasa reveal that there were many
books on astronomy, architecture and philosophy on the shelves
of its library (Ahmed, 1987). Many of these books were later taken
to Baghdad, where Seljuk Vizier rulers established a famous
madrasa of their own, known as Nizam-ul-Mulk Madrasa of
Baghdad (Ahmed, 1987). In the 12th century, madrasa were
founded within the Mughal Empire in India. These madrasas
utilised the syllabus with a wide range of religious and non-religious
courses. When Muslim rulers of India were challenged and toppled
by the British colonisers, madrasa schools were marginalised by
the secular schools where the medium of instruction was English.
This socio-historical change resulted in the almost exclusive focus
on religious courses in the madrasas throughout South Asia. One
of the most prominent madrasas from the colonial period has been
the madrasa founded in Deoband in 1867 (Vestenskov, 2018).
From its establishment until the present, this madrasa provided
regular salaries to its teaching staff, a sizable library, a distinctly
religious curriculum of courses, regular examinations and
certifications awarded upon completion of the study. This madrasa
has exerted a lasting impact on most other madrasas that have
been established in India and other countries of South Asia until
today (Bano, 2010).
Madrasa education, or Islamic college-level learning, has been one
of the most important institutions in the history of Islamic
learning. Throughout the Muslim world there have been numerous
madrasa schools until the present. In some populous Muslim
countries, such as Pakistan, these schools have proliferated in
number due to both, internal and external factors. (Ahmed, 2009).
The number of Pakistani madrasas saw rapid expansion ever since
the founding of Pakistan and in 1980s the number of madrasas
skyrocketed (Ahmed, 2009). Following the dissolution of the
British colonial rule in India and the emergence of Pakistan as an
independent state in 1947, many scholars migrated from Deoband
to the newly-established Pakistan and concerted their efforts
towards founding Deobandi-style religious schools in their new
homeland. Not long after, two madrasas emerged: Darul Uloom
Haqqania in Akora Khattak and the other one Banori in Karachi
(Ahmed, 2009). Presently, majority of madrasas in Pakistan can
be classified under one of the five types whose orientation draws
on the intellectual and political differences among the present
day Muslims of the region. The largest numbers of madrasas in
Pakistan are affiliated with the Barelvi Sunnis, whose syllabuses
and teaching are bitterly opposed to the literalist interpretation of
Islam favoured by the Saudis. In addition to Barelvi and Deoband
madrasas, there are also Ahle Hadith or Salafi and Shi’ah madrasas.
The more obvious and minute differences between these madrasas
go far beyond the scope of this paper and they cannot be covered
here (Siddique, 2009).
In the decades after the establishment of Pakistan, there was
steady increase in the number of madrasa seminaries. One of the
reasons for this development is certainly related to the rapid growth
of the population whereas the other causes have to do with overall
increased presence of Islam in the public life of Pakistan. With all
the causes put together, the upward trend has maintained its pace
until today (Ashraf, 2009 and Saleem, 2017). The rapid increase
in the number of madrasas for purpose of jihad in the 1980s was
followed by the rise of religious extremism that was directly affected
by the armed conflict against the Soviet invasion in neighbouring
Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, to contain the influence of the
Shiah teachings from the neighbouring Iran (Hussain, 2006).
During this period, many countries, including the USA and Saudi
Arabia, extended their aid to Afghan Mujaheddin fighters through
Pakistani security services (Butt, Tahir M and Zahid Y, 2011). In
their rush to deal a blow to the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US and
Pakistani governments tolerated and oftentimes fuelled religious
extremism in madrasas to spread as they expected the armed conflict
against Soviets to take long time and require many recruits (Butt,
Tahir M and Zahid Y, 2011 and International Crisis Group, Asia
Report N°36).
In spite of the fact that these religious schools saw rapid rise
in number, particularly in the last two decades of the 20th century,
madrasas in Pakistan were not studied systematically in the period
up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Ever since the 9/11 attacks many
researchers and analysts have focused their interest on Pakistani
madrasas and the link these schools may have had with the rise of
Al Qaeda and Taliban militancy (Blanchard, 2007, January). Some
of these early post-9/11 studies have reached the conclusion that
madrasas in Pakistan were breeding grounds for the militants taking
part in the armed conflict in Afghanistan. These studies largely
ignored the differences in intellectual and ideological outlook that
existed in these madrasas thus levelling blanket accusation of
propagation of religious extremism and intolerance against all
Pakistani madrasas (Blanchard, 2007, January).
The overall number of madrasas and students studying in these
schools started to increase rapidly during the period of Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Prior to 1982, the number of madrasas in
Pakistan stood at 13,000 whereas the figure of active students was
nearly 1.7 million. Regarding the age of madrasa students, the
largest portion of these students were between the age of five and
eighteen, with a smaller section of those who pursued higher levels
being older than eighteen. In the six-year period from 1982 to
the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1988, about 1,000
new madrasas were added to the above-cited figure (Hussain, 2006).
These madrasas were mostly located in the provinces bordering
with Afghanistan, in North West Frontier Province and in
Balochistan. These newly-established madrasas were controlled by
two movements affiliated with hardline Sunni groups of Jamiate-
e-Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) (Hussain, 2006).
These two movements collaborated with the Pakistani ruling party
of the time as well as with the armed groups of Afghanistan who
fought against the Soviet invaders and their local allies. Due to
the proximity of these madrasas to the territory of Afghanistan,
cultural and linguistic similarities between the Afghans and
Pakistanis living in the vicinity, and the fact that there were millions
of Afghan refugees sheltered in this area, many of the students
enrolling in them were Afghan refugee children (Hussain, 2006).
The commanders of the armed groups in Afghanistan needed large
number of recruits to engage in combat against the technically
superior Soviet invaders. Thus, they turned to these madrasas in
Pakistan for recruitment of boys under eighteen for the use in
armed conflict in Afghanistan. According to Lys out of more than
10,000 madrasas in Pakistan, 15% were found to be preaching
and teaching extremist syllabus, and some of them even provided
military training to students (Lys, 2007). Thus, madrasa graduates
who had been exposed to continual preaching of extremism and
intolerance towards all people, non-Muslims and even Muslims
who did not approve of narrow and literalist interpretation of
certain sources of Islamic learning, were relatively easily persuaded
to join the ranks of the Afghan armed groups (Krondtadt, 2004,
December).
The number of madrasa seminaries continued to increase
rapidly even after the Soviet-Afghan armed conflict and the ensuing
armed struggle for power among the armed groups of Afghanistan.
By 2016, there were around 32,000 madrasa schools issuing
certificates to various levels of students, and the number of students
was 2.26 million. This number is considered to be accurate as it
was arrived at after careful census conducted by Pakistani provincial
governments as part of the National Action Plan adopted in 2015
to aid in the fight against extremism and terrorism (Vestenskov,
2018). At present, five religious groups control and organise the
bulk of the Pakistani madrasas with approval by the Pakistani
government. These are: Deobandi, Brailvi, Ahl-e-Hadith, Shi’ah,
and Jamat-e-Islami/Neutral (Fair, 2014). Not all madrasas in
Pakistan are affiliated with one of these five groups. A smaller
number of recognised madrasas are run by other religious
organisations deemed independent are also part of the approved
network of Islamic schools in Pakistan (Vestenskov, 2018).
Etymologically, the word madrassa is derived from the Arabic noun
m-d-r-s to convey twofold meaning, (Moosa, 2015) and as such it
has been adopted and used in many languages, including Farsi,
Pashto and Urdu. A more general meaning of the word is “school”,
whereas its technical denotation conveys the meaning of an Islamic
college or seminary where all major Islamic sciences were taught,
and these include the sciences and the study of the Qur’an, the
cluster of sciences around the larger field of knowledge called the
Sunnah or the traditions of the Messenger Muhammad (s.a.w.),
Islamic jurisprudence and law and others (Makdisi, 1981). In
some Arab countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon, the term
madrassa is used to denote any kind of school be it private or
public, religious or secular. However, in Afghanistan, Bangladesh
and Pakistan the name madrassa refers specifically to Islamic school
(Blanchard, 2007, January).  Regarding the curriculum,
contemporary Pakistani madrasa still emphasises the core
traditional Islamic courses of the Holy Qur’an and Hadith, Islamic
jurisprudence, and History of Islamic lands and societies. Modern
natural and social sciences and European languages such as English
are grossly neglected. This type of learning makes it hard for
madrasa graduates to seek any other employment except the jobs
related to overseeing and performing religious rites for the
community. Some researchers have also noted that rote learning
of the Islamic texts and the exclusion of modern rational sciences
have made madrasa students more susceptible to persuasion from
militant groups to enlist and take part in armed conflict (Lys,
2007).
Contemporary madrasas in Pakistan are financed in many ways
that can all be categorised as internal funding and external financial
support. Apart from the previously-mentioned age-old funding
through the institution of waqf and zakat, madrasa officials and
students receive financial backing from governmental and non-
governmental organisations, from their own assets (land and
commercial premises owned by the madrasa), and individuals.
Government and political groups support madrasas as these schools
educate and train individuals to carry out essential religious duties
in a society, and to gain support for their activities, particularly in
pre-election campaigns (Vestenskov, 2018). Individual donors from
Pakistan mostly contribute their means through specific appeals
for donations during congregational prayers on Friday and religious
holidays, particularly during the month of Ramadan when majority
of Muslims intensify their charitable acts. In addition to these,
significant portions of finances for the Pakistani madrasas come
from the sizeable Pakistani diasporas (Vestenskov, 2018). This type
of funding is either banked in to the accounts of madrasa officials,
or it is handed in-person during the visits of relatives by the
wealthier Pakistanis who live and work abroad. Furthermore, some
madrasas own significant areas of agricultural land and commercial
property the use or rent of which provides a portion of the total
revenue. Some madrasas have largely depended on the donations
by foreign non-governmental organisations, however, this has
significantly decreased in the post-9/11 era in the wake of Pakistani
government’s attempt to curtail the influence of foreign
organisations on local Islamic schools (Vestenskov, 2018).
The link between madrassa and militancy was not known until
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was in the eighties that there
emerged first studies linking this religious school to the recruitment
of mostly underage students for armed conflict against the Soviet
invaders of Afghanistan. Additionally, from the same period, there
are plenty of sources indicating the spread of militant teaching
imbued with some Islamic tradition to motivate the students to
take up arms against the foreign invasion in Afghanistan. This
spread of militant teaching was tolerated and even openly
supported by the American political, intelligence and military
establishment as well as the governments of some European
countries, Pakistan and a group of Arab Gulf countries (Hussain,
2006). At the time of the Soviet invasion there was not much
awareness nor consideration as to what consequences this open-
handed support of militancy through the vast network of Afghan
and Pakistani madrassa might have in the future. The financial
and logistic backers of the project only realised that the whole
issue had spun out of control in the nineties, when these schools
had given rise to radical movements some of which are later to be
put on the list of terrorist groups with influence far beyond the
region of South and Central Asia (Blanchard, 2007, January).
Pakistan as a state and its officials have ample times been linked
with extremism by the international community as well as the
Afghan authorities. More specifically, the army of Pakistan and
the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have been identified
as institutions supporting the madrasas and even overt or covert
backing of extremism. This link was more evident during the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and this collusion between Pakistani state
authorities and extremists has been amply supported by research
(Hayes, 2009). The issue here is why has this backing of radicals
in Afghanistan continued after the 9/11 despite the denials by
high-ranking Pakistani officials? One of the possible explanations
for this is that at least some of the active officers of the army and
the ISI are madrasa graduates and they are unwilling to carry out
orders of their superiors that would harm their alma mater (Singer,
2001). Another important reason is that Afghan Talibans are
believed to provide assurance and buffer against the influence of
Pakistan’s archenemy, India, in the region (Mohanty, 2013).
Pakistani officials are also frequently accused of playing ‘double
game’ by verbally supporting the efforts of the US administration
and Afghan government in their fight against armed groups and
terrorists, and at the same time, colluding with the Taliban and
the Haqqanis Network (Mohanty, 2013). Therefore, as alluded
before, any action against the numerous madrasas in Pakistan would
pitch the state security forces against a wide array of Islamic-
oriented parties, organisations, educationists and intellectuals that
could seriously undermine the secular roots of the country
(Mohanty, 2013 and Krondtadt, 2004, December).
Apart from the Taliban and the Haqqani Network influence
in the Pakistani provinces bordering with Afghanistan, other
groups, such as Hizb-e-Islami and even Al Qaeda have been reported
to partly perform their recruitment from the madrasas in the region.
On top of that, there have also been myriad reports that these
armed groups receive significant support from the armed forces
and the ISI of Pakistan in their training of suicide bombers and
cross-border raids. Although these allegations have been rejected
but the Pakistani officials, the UN report of 2007 clearly named
the Pakistani officials as providers of various types of aid for the
armed groups in the Afghan war (Fair, 2007 and Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008). Recruitment of suicide
bombers is mostly done in Pakistani madrasas even though this
claim has been disputed by many terrorism scholars and
commentators. The Taliban themselves have been the product of
madrasas, hence their name, and they have long been filling their
ranks with underage recruits from the madrasas.
During the war against the Soviets, madrasa drafting was
encouraged and even openly supported by the American and
Pakistani officials. In the decade prior to the 9/11 attacks the issue
was not considered news-worthy as it was only a regional problem.
However, when the long-lasting practice continued after the 9/
11, there followed an outcry of the international community about
the global threat of terrorist and suicide bombers drafted from the
madrasas (Wilkey, 2014). In a recent exchange between US and
Pakistani ambassadors to the UN, the former accused the latter of
being hypocritical and playing ‘double game’ and helping very
little in containing terrorism in Afghanistan in spite of receiving
US$33 billion in military aid over the last decade and a half. This
accusation was met by flat denial and claims that Pakistan has
done more than any other country in counter-terrorism operations
(Haley 3 January 2018). The practice of recruitment and use of
child soldiers from madrasas in Pakistan is covered in more detail
in one of the sections below.
Legal stance on child soldiers in the context of this paper is twofold.
On the one hand there is the position of the three branches of
international law: International Humanitarian Law International
Human Rights Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law
(IHRL) and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Rome Statute of the ICC) (Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court); on the other hand, the position of the legal systems
of Afghanistan and Pakistan requires a closer analysis. As for the
international law, based on the relevant treaties that are treated in
more detail below, all the three branches prohibit recruitment
and use of child soldiers below the age of fifteen. In recent decades
there have been certain attempts to lift this age limit to eighteen,
however, to date all these initiatives have been unsuccessful.
National laws of Afghanistan and Pakistan have clear stance
regarding child soldiering: no persons below the age of eighteen is
allowed to take part in hostilities, even though, in case of Pakistan,
the enlistment of persons over the age of sixteen can be allowed for
the purpose of attending military academies.
Regarding the specific branches of international law, IHL’s
fundamental treaties, such as the four 1949 Geneva Conventions
(GCs). (Geneva Convention I, Geneva Convention II Geneva
Convention III, and Geneva Convention IV) These treaties do not
offer any provisions regarding child soldiering due to the fact that
children are only deemed as subgroup of civilian population.
However, the presence of numerous child soldiers in the worldwide
armed conflicts in the decades following the entry into force of
GCs clearly called for a more adequate stance of international treaties
on child soldiers. As a result of the perceived need for provisions
dealing with child soldiers, the Additional Protocols (APs)
(Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II) to the GCs
were drafted and adopted in 1977. These conventions forbid the
recruitment of children under the age of fifteen and their use in
combat, or what they phrase as direct participation in hostilities
(Additional Protocol I, Article 77 and Additional Protocol II, Article
4 (3). Apart from the major IHL treaties, the landmark treaties of
IHRL, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
(Convention on the Rights of the Child) prohibits the recruitment
of children under the age of fifteen into the armed forces
(Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 38). This
prohibition was criticised by many because the Article 1 of the
convention emphasises that child is any person below the age of
eighteen, and the prohibition only applies to those child soldiers
younger than fifteen. In other words, the prohibition does not
cover all children, but solely the younger ones (Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Article 1). Moreover, The Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in armed conflict (OP-CRC) (Optional
Protocol) pegs the prohibition up to the age of eighteen albeit
with somewhat weaker wording that states parties to the conflict
should adopt all feasible measures to prevent persons younger than
eighteen from taking direct part in hostilities. In addition to this,
the OP-CRC stipulates that armed forces and armed groups should
ensure that no persons younger than eighteen are forcibly recruited
or allowed to take direct part in hostilities. Moreover, the OP-
CRC prohibits recruiting voluntary children blow age of fifteen in
military drill (Optional Protocol, Article 1 to 4). In a similar vein,
the Rome Statute of the Rome Statute of the ICC proscribes the
recruitment and use in hostilities of child soldiers under the age
of fifteen by categorising this act as a war crime (Rome Statute of
the ICC, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and (2)(e)(vii)). Therefore, all
international treaties offer clear prohibition of child soldiering for
the individuals younger than fifteen, whereas, in spite of numerous
attempts to peg the prohibition up to the age of eighteen, these
conventions have permissive stance vis-à-vis recruitment and use
in armed conflict of persons above fifteen.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan clearly
prohibits all forms of forced labour, particularly forced labour of
children. However, the article that contains the said prohibition
is somewhat ambiguous, and it calls for a closer analysis. The
general prohibition of forced labour is found in Article 49 of the
Afghanistan Constitution which states: “Forced labour shall be
forbidden. Active participation in times of war, disaster and other
situations that threaten public life and comfort shall be among
the national duties of every Afghan. Forced labour on children
shall not be allowed” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Article
49). The article contains three unnumbered sentences in its official
version in Pashto and Dari. Contrary to its text in local languages,
the translated English version of this article is numbered. What
can be seen as confusing is the fact that if the second sentence of
this article is viewed in isolation from the other two, it can be
interpreted as making active participation in war, disaster and other
circumstances endangering public life and well-being an obligation
to every citizen of Afghanistan. More specifically, this sentence
could be taken as justification of recruitment of children for armed
conflict, and this possibility of interpretation has been duly noticed
by some commentators (Ehler, R. L., et al., 2015).  Bearing in
mind that the government of Afghanistan has signed all major
international treaties concerning child soldiers, this cannot be the
intent of the drafters. On the other hand, if 49(2) is seen as
modifying 49(1), then forced labour on children would be strictly
forbidden as well as participation of children in armed conflict,
disaster rescue missions and other emergencies requiring the
mobilisation of citizens. Therefore, taking the totality of the
Constitution of Afghanistan into consideration, it can be
concluded that the second interpretation is closer to the original
intention of the drafters. Yet, this intention could and should
have been more directly and unambiguously put into words (Ehler,
R. L., et al., 2015).
In 2014, the Government of Afghanistan drafted a specific
law prohibiting recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed
conflict. This law is titled as Law on Prohibition of Juveniles
Recruitment in Military Units (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
2014). Article 2(1) of this law defines a child as any person below
the age of eighteen. In accordance with this definition of the child,
the law forbids recruitment and use of any person younger than
eighteen in combat. Since this prohibition sets even stricter criteria
of recruitment than IHL and IHRL documents, it was welcomed
by many Afghan government officials, national and international
observers and commentators (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
2014, Article 2(1)). Furthermore, Article 2(2) specifies that the
term armed forces or units comprises the following organisations:
Ministries of National Defence and Interior Affairs, National
Directorate of Security (ANDS) and other armed agencies that
are required to carry out military, security or support activities in
accordance with legal provisions. Moreover, in Article 3, the law
unequivocally prohibits conscription and use of children into armed
forces in any capacity (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2014,
Article 3). In the following, Article 4, it recommends criminal
prosecution and a sentence to one year of any military officer
involved in recruiting children into the armed forces of the country
(Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2014, Article 4). In addition to
this, Article 5 provides that any person who resorts to falsification
of documents, such as birth certificates and other similar proofs of
age is to be prosecuted under the relevant provisions of the law.
This article was seen as a necessary addition to the law due to
widespread reports of forgery of official documents so as to enlist a
person younger than eighteen into the armed forces (Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, 2014, Article 5).
In addition to the national laws forbidding illegal methods of
warfare and child soldiering, the Government of Afghanistan has
firmly committed itself to the observance of international laws
and standards. To this end, the Government reiterated its
obligation to abide by all major treaties that aim to regulate
conduct of hostilities and recruitment and use of underage
combatants. For instance, the Government of Afghanistan signed
the GCs on 26 September 1956 (International Committee Red
Cross, Treaties). The Four GCs do not refer to child soldiers; rather,
these conventions contain a set of agreed upon rules of legally
acceptable methods of warfare. A specific reference to children in
armed conflict is found in the APs to the GCs I and II, which were
drafted in 1977. The APs I and II were signed and ratified by the
Afghanistan government on 10 November, 2009 (ICRC,
Afghanistan as party of Additional Protocols). Similarly, as for the
treaties of IHRL, of which CRC is oft-cited example, the
Government of Afghanistan ratified it on 28 March, 1994 (United
Nations Treaty Collection). Moreover, OP-CRC was signed and
ratified by the Afghanistan government on 24 September, 2003
(ICRC, Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries). Finally, Rome
Statute of the ICC that was drafted in 1998, the government of
Afghanistan signed and ratified it on 10 February, 2003 (Rome
Statue of the ICC). With the exception of the Four GCs, all of the
aforesaid international treaties clearly prohibit recruitment and
use of persons below the age of fifteen into armed conflict. Therefore,
by signing these international treaties the Government of
Afghanistan has directly shown its readiness not to violate the
international standards on child soldiering.
Regarding the position of the state of Pakistan on the relevant
international treaties it is important to emphasise that Pakistani
government ratified the CRC on December 12, 1990 (Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989). Moreover, the
Pakistani officials have signed the OP-CRC on the involvement of
children in armed conflict, but this signature has not been ratified
until the present. Furthermore, Pakistani government ratified
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICECPR) in 2008 (International Covenant on Economic, 16
December 1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2010 (International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 16 December 1966). On the other hand,
Pakistan has not signed nor ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC
until the present day (Child Soldiers International NGO Report,
July 2015). As for the national legislation on child recruits, the
Pakistan National Service Ordinance 1970 stipulates the age of
enlistment in the armed forces is 18 years, whereas the training
for various branches of the army could legally start from the age of
sixteen (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2002).
According to the national laws and act, Pakistan does not have
compulsory national service. However, the national legislation
prohibits persons younger than eighteen from active participation
in hostilities (National Commission for Child Welfare and
Development, 2003).
Additionally, despite its ratification of the CRC, there is no
uniformly applicable definition of the child as a person younger
than eighteen that would be in harmony with Article One of the
CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 1). In regard
to the Pakistani legislation on the issue of child soldiers an
important amendment to the constitution of Pakistan was passed
in 2010 (Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2 October 2009),
in which the matters concerning legislation, administration and
finances were devolved to the provincial authorities. In line with
this, charting out and application of the protection services is the
responsibility of the provincial social welfare departments. Yet,
the authorities in the provinces where the cases of child recruitment
from madrasas have been most prevalent, such as Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas have not developed adequate legal mechanisms to prevent
child conscription (Tribune, 1 June 2015). As a result of this gap
and the pressure of international community on the government
of Pakistan, the federal authorities founded the National
Committee on Children in December 2015 (Mohtasib, 31
December 2014), an independent commission that works under
the office of the Federal Ombudsman where United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) personnel
are allowed to serve as observers (Child Soldiers International NGO
Report, July 2015). As a conclusion, although the national
legislation of Pakistan contains laws against recruitment and use
in armed conflict of underage soldiers, and though this is clearly
against the international legal provisions, the practice has continued
unabated and, as evidence indicates, even encouraged by the
Pakistani officials for their own objectives.
Due to the nature of the Afghan society and perceived requirements
of armed resistance against the Soviet invaders, a number of armed
groups that emerged out of the main anti-Soviet group called
Mujaheddin heavily relied upon the use of some religious teachings
to motivate underage soldiers to enlist into their ranks (Cohn, I.,
1994). These groups are, namely, Hezb-e-Islam, Taliban, Al Qaeda,
and Haqqani Network. All of these groups have been proven to
wield influence over certain madrasas in Pakistan. As a result, these
armed groups have welcomed underage madrasa students into their
ranks, and some of the armed groups have even used underage
soldiers to carry out acts of terrorism and suicide bombing (Aftanas,
2014, and Rosen, 2015). Madrasa seminaries are more popular in
Pakistan’s North West, near the border with Afghanistan, than
anywhere else across the country (Javaid, 2011). Throughout the
period of Soviet invasion (Rashid, 2000) and the civil war between
the Taliban and Northern Alliance other contenders for power,
the madrasas from the north-west of Pakistan sent their students
into the ranks of either Taliban or Hezb-e-Islam (Child Soldiers
International, 2001). The number of underage soldiers recruited
in these madrasas and sent into combat in Afghanistan was measured
in thousands (de Berry, 2009). These students were recruited and
used in combat by the Mujaheddin as jihad fighters. The support
of various armed groups in Afghanistan by the Pakistani officials
dating back to the Mujaheddin era, continued through the last
decade of the 20th century. In 1996, the recruitment of thousands
of madrasa students was one of the decisive factors in the Taliban
offensive that enabled this group to seize control of Kabul and the
bulk of the territory of Afghanistan (Hussain, 2009).
The organisation known as Hezb-e-Islami recruited far more
underage soldiers in the period before the 9/11 attacks (Bhatia,
2008). These child soldiers mainly hailed from the refugee camps
and madrasas in Pakistan (Aftanas, 2014). Although this armed
group did not cease to conscript and use children armed conflict
even after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the number of child soldiers
in the ranks of this group decreased significantly. Due to the overall
vital role of Gulbudin Hekmatyar in the establishment and leading
of Hezb-e-Islami, this group is referred to by some researchers as
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbudin (HIG) (European Union: European
Asylum Support Office, 10 July 2012). As for Al Qaeda, this
terrorist organisation has not relied heavily on child soldiers as
Hezb-e-Islami and Taliban have. However, some prominent cases
of child soldiers within the ranks of Al Qaeda did attract a great
deal of attention by researchers. One such case was a child soldiers
by the name of Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen whose father had
decided to enlist himself and his fifteen-year-old son Omar into
Al Qaeda. Omar was injured in combat against the US forces. He
was arrested and taken to court as an unlawful combatant (Singer,
Peter Warren, 2006).
Child soldiers were also recruited in large numbers by the
Haqqani Network, however, the precise numbers of underage
combatants in this armed group are hard to determine (Rosen,
2015). A significant portion of the underage soldiers in Haqqani
Network came from the madrasas in Pakistan. Some researchers
have put forward that Haqqani Network is notorious for the use
of madrasa students for suicide bombing missions (Hussain, 2008).
The commanders of Haqqani Network have even recruited children
as young as seven or eight years old. The Haqqani Network
recruiters have targeted children whose piety and lack of ability to
make decisions on their own and subjected them to persuasion
and training to carry out suicide bombing (European Union:
European Asylum Support Office, September 2016). Child soldiers
recruited by the Haqqani Network were persuaded by allegations
that foreign soldiers had desecrated the copies of the Holy Qur’an.
These children were promised rewards in the Hereafter, and in
some cases, the child soldiers were told they will survive suicide
missions unharmed (European Union: European Asylum Support
Office, September 2016). A significant number of child soldiers
hailed from the families whose fathers or other close relative had
fought alongside the founders of the Haqqani against the Soviet
invaders (Dressler, 2010).
Taliban have relied on large-scale child recruitment and use
in combat from the mid-1990s. Each family living in the territory
controlled by the Taliban, including the refugee families in Pakistan
was expected to send one young male for training and later for
combat. The families were also required to contribute USD 500
for the expenses incurred by Taliban cause. Young recruits
underwent a two-month-long participation in armed conflict upon
brief training (Human Rights Watch, 2003). In some exceptional
cases families were allowed to pay USD 200-300 penalty for not
sending their underage members into Taliban ranks. In spite of
this pressure, Taliban recruitment of underage soldiers was mostly
voluntary, however, during major military campaigns, some
recruits were compelled to join this armed group (Danish
Immigration Service, 1 July 1998). Some madrasa officials reported
that most of their students were recruited and used into armed
conflict by Taliban (Child Soldiers International, 2001). These
madrasa officials and Taliban recruiters cited jihad as a religious
duty and integral part of Islamic education to motivate the students
to take part in combat (Singh, 2007). Taliban commanders were
aware of the international criticism of their recruitment and use of
child soldiers. In an attempt to rebuff these allegations, Taliban
commanders resorted to the use of child soldiers in the period of
major offensives, whereas the rest of the time they used to assign
policing duties away from the combat zone to their underage
soldiers (Singh, 2007).
During the major offensive in the vicinity of Kabul in July
1999, there were reports that between 3,000 and 5,000 Pakistani
recruits from various organisations with Islamic orientation were
sent the Taliban forces north of the capital (Fonseka, 2001). Some
of these recruits were reportedly war veterans from the conflict in
Kashmir, while others were students from madrasas. Although these
recruits were meant to reinforce Taliban in their offensive against
the opposing armed groups, some reports cite that these forces
did not fall under Taliban chain of command, instead, these soldiers
were channelled to Usama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network
(UN General Assembly Security Council, 7 July 1999). In the
same period, a Taliban delegation toured all major madrasas in the
Pakistani North-West Province, which is mostly inhabited by ethnic
Pashtuns and where the most of Afghan refugees were sheltered,
requesting the school authorities to persuade students to enlist
into the Taliban forces in the war in Afghanistan. About 5,000
students responded positively and joined the Taliban on this
occasion. The UN sources cited the age of these recruits was between
15 and 35 (Galpin, 21 August 1999).
Recruitment of children within Pakistani madrasas for armed
conflict in Afghanistan has particularly been prevalent among the
students and orphans. According to multiple sources, majority of
draftees were between the age of eleven and fifteen, whereas some
of the recruits were as young as the age of five. The interviewed
recruiters cited their understanding of the fight for higher religious
cause as the reason for conscription (Benotman, 2016). Some of
the child recruits were chosen for suicide bombing missions.
According to a Pakistani analyst of militancy and madrasa schools,
child suicide bombers make up to 90% of perpetrators in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Benotman, 2016). The recruiters used
a variety of techniques to persuade the children to carry out suicide
bombings. Some of the methods referred to the culturally esteemed
issues of honour and revenge, while others drew on the religious
theme of martyrdom or even promises that the child will survive
the mission unhurt and be able to claim monetary prize (Fraser,
2017). A survey of captured underage Taliban fighters, such as
the case of a twelve-year-old boy from Peshawar, revealed that they
had been subjected to a long training to carry out suicide bombing
attacks. The Afghan officials involved in handling the captured
underage Taliban soldiers confirmed that the vast majority, or 90%
of them had been trained using intricate deceptive methods and
brainwashing by their instructors on the territory of Pakistan. In
addition to these, some reports have also pointed to madrasas in
the Taliban controlled parts of Afghanistan as recruitment facilities
for underage soldiers (European Union: European Asylum Support
Office, September 2016). As had been confirmed before, Taliban
continued to deceive their thoroughly brainwashed child suicide
bombers, lying to them that “the mission was as simple as touching
two wires together” and promising to them they would remain
unharmed upon the completion of the gruesome terrorist act (Ben,
13 Jan 2012).
Taliban continued with their recruitment of underage soldiers
after they had been deposed from power in late 2001. A BBC
report of 2007 claimed that Taliban used in combat 120 recruits
from government schools and madrasas in the town of Tank,
northern Pakistan. The report alleged these underage soldiers to
have been between the age of eleven and fifteen. To persuade them
to join the ranks of the armed group there were elements of
compulsion as the families who hesitated to send their children in
combat suffered intense fear of retribution by the Taliban (Syed,
12 Jan 2007). In 2010, out of more than 400 Taliban soldiers
taken prisoners, 57% of them replied that they had decided to
enlist due to poverty. Other sources highlighted that about 70%
of the young Taliban fighters had enlisted and taken part in combat
because of the monetary rewards, not for any other reasons
(European Union: European Asylum Support Office, 10 July
2012). The recruitment and use of child soldiers by Taliban has
been continuously confirmed by multiple sources. These cases
were also verified by recent UN reports, such as the report of
2016 highlighting the total 115 cases of child soldiers in
Afghanistan, 48 of which were verified. Out of these cases, the
largest number or twenty children were recruited by the Taliban,
whereas fifteen underage combatants were recruited by other armed
groups, and the remaining child soldiers by other parties to the
conflict. This report reiterated concerns over allegations of
recruitment of children from the madrasas in Pakistan, most of
who were drafted by the Taliban while the portion of them were
also recruited and used in combat by other armed groups (UN
General Assembly Security Council, 2016).
On a concluding note, international law does not permit
recruitment and use of any persons below the age of fifteen. Rome
Statute of ICC best summarises the move to conscript children
under the age of fifteen by qualifying it as a war crime. The
qualification sums up the position of fundamental treaties of IHL
and IHRL. The desire to push the age limit from fifteen to eighteen
is clearly noticeable in the drafting process and relevant
commentaries of major international treaties, yet this desire has
not come to fruition until the present. The laws of Afghanistan,
starting from the constitution to specific acts and laws has never
permitted recruitment and use of persons below the age of eighteen
on any capacity in military units. A similar position on child
soldiering is found in the laws of Pakistan, with an exception that
persons over the age of sixteen can be enrolled into military schools
for the purpose of education and training to be future officers in
the Pakistani armed forces. This legal stance, both international
and national ones have been constantly violated throughout the
forty-year armed conflict in Afghanistan.
The massive conscription and use of underage persons in
combat from madrasas started soon after the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan. The urgent need to resist the foreign invader with
potent anti-religious ideology was a good pretext for many sides,
including the USA administration and a number of Gulf States to
finance and promote jihad through madrasas in Pakistan. During
this stage of the conflict, this type of preaching and teaching was
not seen as potential menace, rather, it was perceived as a powerful
mobilising force to convince masses of underage madrasa students
to enlist and take part in hostilities. Since the laws of both countries,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan alike, did not permit conscription and
use in combat of persons under eighteen, the recruitment was
carried out by armed groups, the most prominent being the
Mujaheddin of Afghanistan. The term Mujaheddin itself
incorporates the word jihad, but such designation did not invoke
any negative image in the eyes and minds of US officials or other
who had backed the armed group. Quite contrary, the Mujaheddin
were widely seen as freedom fighters and liberating force defending
their homes from foreign invasion. However, this wide backing
and positive image of the Mujaheddin did not last long.
Once the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan,
and the Mujaheddin split into many factions each fighting to
wrestle control over Afghanistan, the reality of hasty support and
promotion of jihad and tolerating the illicit recruitment and use
of children in combat dawned on many international and national
factors. Towards the end of the 20th century and in almost two
decades of this century child soldiers have been constant presence
in the armed conflict of Afghanistan. All parties to the conflict
have recruited and used them although the armed groups have
done so on a much larger scale. The armed groups have also used
children to perform terrorist acts and suicide bombing claiming
the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians. To persuade their
child bombers to execute the attacks, a great deal of brainwashing
madras students is involved. Susceptible children are driven into
suicide missions by brainwashing techniques that make the enemy
appear as infidel force that must be resisted by all means. When
news and reports of these methods appeared, the practice was
universally criticised and condemned. Using lies and deception to
arouse strong emotion and belief they would be unharmed in
children, some of them younger than ten, is viewed equally
unacceptable by Islamic legal scholars as well as experts in
international law. Suicide bombing with child soldiers as
perpetrators has mostly been carried out by Taliban, Al Qaeda,
Haqqani Network and Hezb-e-Islami armed groups. These groups
have repeatedly denied the practice, but the ongoing incidence
and evidence have strongly proven their involvement and
culpability.
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